

*1 July 1965*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Support of DIA Counterinsurgency Analysis

Statement of the Problem

*1990*

1. In a 15 March 1965 memorandum to the DCI, General Carroll requested that the CIA undertake as soon as possible the task of providing political, economic, psychological and sociological intelligence to assist DIA in meeting the requirements of the U.S. Commands which are becoming increasingly involved in counterinsurgency activities. This study will examine that request and consider what steps could be taken if it is determined to more fully and specifically meet the DIA requirements, as stated in its EEIs, through basic intelligence produced in the Directorate of Intelligence.

Assumptions

2. There will be a valid and continuing requirement for intelligence support specifically tailored to counterinsurgency activities.
3. Adjustments in production to meet the counterinsurgency requirements will have to be of such a nature that they can be accomplished under current manpower and budgetary restrictions without sacrifice of valuable and proven intelligence production designed to satisfy a broad spectrum of consumer requirements.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

4. When similar EEIs were forwarded to CIA in 1962, the Chairman, USIB noted that existing basic, current and estimative intelligence production would most likely provide the essential elements of information formulated by General Krulak. During an exchange of views at USIB in this connection, General Carroll suggested that certain intelligence programs such as the NIS might be reoriented or modified to fulfill the needs set forth in General Krulak's memorandum.

5. Early in 1965, the Secretary of Defense approved the report on "Research in the Department of Defense on Internal Conflict and Insurgency in Developing Countries" by the Subcommittee on Behavioral Sciences, Defense Science Board. The subcommittee recommended that a systematic program be developed for external research to focus on the major problems and inter-relationship of military, political, economic, and general cultural factors affecting conflict and insurgency. The subcommittee also found that the Department of Defense is spending about 7.9 million dollars in FY 1965 on nonmateriel research directly relevant to counterinsurgency, a 52%

45

1 July 1963

increase over FY 1964. This is quite apart from DIA's expenditure relating to counterinsurgency.

### Discussion

6. Many experienced intelligence officers might argue that the current emphasis on intelligence support for counterinsurgency is largely a matter of semantics -- that socio-political intelligence always has been directed, in part, to this or related problems. It was logical from an intelligence point of view to present such information, when appropriate, in terms of subversion or sources of discontent for whatever policy/planning contingencies, rather than earmarked for specific operation considerations as implied in the term "counterinsurgency".

7. In some measure, the earlier 1962 position -- that existing intelligence programs essentially meet counterinsurgency requirements -- remains valid. This was a position subscribed to by General Carroll who so noted, and specifically referred to the NIS, in his letter of transmittal forwarding the General Krulak memorandum in May 1962. The EEIs contained many questions that can be answered directly from certain NIS units, in addition to Subversion now being produced. Among these are : (a) Characteristics of the People, particularly in the subsection dealing with social values, attitudes and customs; (b) Religion, Education, and Public Information; (c) Manpower, notably in the subsection concerning labor and labor-management relations; (d) Welfare, in its treatment of levels of living and socio-psychological discontents; (e) Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, concerning the strengths and weaknesses of the economic sector most pertinent to the socio-political problems raised by the EEIs; and, of course, (f) General Surveys, now produced at the rate of 30 per year which, at least in a general way, will satisfy much of the DIA requirement. For some countries, the General Survey treatment of counterinsurgency factors may be all that is appropriate to the level of information available.

8. The Office of Basic Intelligence in 1962 did respond to the earlier counterinsurgency requirements by proposing an increase in the scheduled production of the Subversion unit from eight to twelve units annually. The criticality lists (of which there were a few) were to be used as guides to scheduling. That this has not always been achieved or even scheduled with respect to either number or content has been directed by NIS Outline for the Subversion unit was somewhat revised for use with counterinsurgency areas to make the unit more responsive to the stated interests.

9. Many of the EEIs can be satisfied only by very current evaluation and through the estimative process. It is apparent that current intelligence production, NIEs and SNIEs, have indeed been highly responsive to counterinsurgency requirements. Although fewer in number, the Handbooks for Special Operations are also pertinent. Taken together, the product of the Directorate of Intelligence has been uniquely responsive in terms of both relevant quantity and quality to the demand for intelligence support of counterinsurgency activities, leaving no impression that it is abdicationing its responsibilities in the field of socio-political intelligence.

10. DD/I support for counterinsurgency activity should take into account the planned DoD consolidation of efforts in the social sciences directed toward the fundamental problems of developing countries (see Para. 3 above). Defense apparently envisages coordination of "counterinsurgency" research within DoD and then with other agencies as appropriate, though its own financial resources in this field are evidently far greater than those available to the DD/I. It would have to be determined whether a major DD/I effort to satisfy current DIA requirements would unnecessarily duplicate or conflict with the DoD plans, or rather, be asserting a de facto primacy in this field of intelligence.

11. It remains a fact that there is an apparent considerable pressure for a tailored publication now which would most nearly satisfy the DIA requirement as formulated in its EEIs. The consumer, the US Command in this instance, perhaps understandably prefers a single package rather than be referred to many publications that provide essentially the same information.

12. It would appear logical in this case to utilize the DD/I publication that now most nearly equates with the counterinsurgency problem -- the NIS unit on Subversion -- as the basis for improvement and alteration of content to meet the DIA established EEIs. A close examination of the EEIs, however, indicates that, as now formulated, they are not necessarily a desirable benchmark upon which to base a sophisticated intelligence publication. They are repetitive, wooden, and poorly arranged in their detailed sub-questions.

13. A very substantially revised outline for the Subversion unit of the NIS is possible, though, which will improve the EEIs as presented and provide all the essential information required as feasible and applicable to basic intelligence. In this expanded NIS unit -- which possibly could be retitled Subversion and Insurgency -- no attempt would be made to answer the purely estimative queries (though trends can be indicated as appropriate) nor the transitory material more pertinent to current intelligence reporting. (A proposed outline for the Subversion and Insurgency unit is attached.)

14. To more fully meet the expressed requirements, it would be necessary to increase the production of the Subversion and Insurgency unit to a standard 15 units annually. Apparently, DIA is thinking in terms of area coverage greater than any criticality list, but an attempt to match the planned DIA production of 24 studies on Cold War Insurgency Analysis would appear to be out of the range of feasibility. Production at the annual rate of 15 would provide for an adequate four-year cycle for the approximately 60 countries on which such coverage would be desirable. For some countries earlier revision might be appropriate and feasible while units on other relatively stable countries could be substantially valid for longer than four years.

15. It is estimated by OCI that the revised and expanded outline for the Subversion and Insurgency unit could require as much as a 20% increase in analyst research effort. An established production commitment of 15 Subversion units represents a 50% increase over OCI's low production commitment for ten of these units in FY 1966. In March 1965 OCI estimated that its FY 1966 contribution to the NIS amounted to 34.7 man years based upon an average figure of 4 man-months per unit. The suggested increase in both total units and separate unit expansion could add, statistically speaking, about 2.8 man years to the OCI production effort. Realistically viewed, the man years commitment probably would be considerably less than that. The consequent increase of workload in OBI can be accomplished if the Socio-Political Branch is maintained at full T/O strength, but some overall slowdown of processing and review in that branch inevitably will result unless absorbed through uncompensated overtime.

16. It should be recognized that the new Subversion and Insurgency unit would not fulfill all counterinsurgency requirements in depth. The NIS must continue to be responsive to a broad range of consumer requirements rather than be narrowly channelled to a special purpose. It can, however, go a long way toward meeting the DIA's departmental requirement and be a valuable base upon which to build.

#### Conclusion

17. There is some basis for maintaining the previously expressed CIA position that existing intelligence publications meet the DIA requirement for socio-political support of counterinsurgency activities.

18. In view of apparent pressure to provide a single package intelligence support of counterinsurgency, it is probably wiser to make an additional effort to assist DIA in this field through the indicated intensification and expansion of DD/I activity on the NIS Subversion unit.

1 July 1965

Recommendation

19. Approval be given to establishing the NIS unit on Subversion and Insurgency -- revised and expanded in light of the EEIs submitted with General Carroll's memorandum of 23 March -- and to increasing the production of these units as indicated above, as the principal response to the DIA request for intelligence support of its counterinsurgency requirements.

JAMES A. BRAMMELL  
Director of Basic Intelligence

Attachment